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The author examines the recent cases and rulings defining the
circumstances under which discretionary commodity accounts
will be considered a security. After describing the three major
types of discretionary accounts the author concludes that only
those accounts in which the broker and the investor have a com-
mon economic interest or dependence should be treated as securi-
ties. The author argues that in light of both the essential role in
the commodities market played by discretionary accounts and
the added investor protection provided by new commodities legis-
lation, the courts should be slow to impose securities treatment
upon discretionary accounts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967 the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that a contract between a broker and an
investor giving the broker discretion to trade in commodities futures
contracts was itself a security.) Since then, at least one United
States district court in each circuit except the First' has had to
* Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. There were three more cases in the Second Circuit, Scheer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,086
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The
others, by circuit are: Third Circuit, Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066
(M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973); Fourth Circuit, Rochkind v. Reynolds
Securities, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975); Fifth Circuit, SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Sixth Circuit, Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,862 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Seventh
Circuit, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. I1. 1970), aff'd, 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,167 (7th Cir. 1977); Eighth Circuit, Marshall v. Lamson
Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Anderson v. Francis I. Dupont, 291 F. Supp.
705 (D. Minn. 1968); Ninth Circuit, Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Tenth Circuit, Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39
(10th Cir. 1973) (by implication only). See also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder, 413 F. Supp.
852 (D.D.C. 1976), where the court discussed different treatment for discretionary accounts.
The decisions are aligned as follows:
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decide whether or not the particular discretionary agreement before
it was an "investment contract" and as such a "security." 3 Further-
more, the Seventh and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided
the issue and have reached apparently conflicting positions.
The Seventh Circuit, in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities' held
that where the success or failure of each account had no effect on
other accounts being handled by the same broker, there was no
investment contract. The Fifth Circuit, in SEC v. Continental Com-
modities Corp,,' found that since "the fortuity of the investments
collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise, 7 the
discretionary accounts involved in that case were investment con-
tracts. On September 6, 1977, in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council,
Inc.,' the Seventh Circuit affirmed its continuing adherence to
Milnarik and further held, as intimated in Milnarik, that a pooling
of funds or a pro-rata sharing in proceeds is an essential element of
a common enterprise.'
There are two basic reasons why the courts are split. First, the
courts differ in their interpretation of the "common enterprise" re-
quirement announced by the United States Supreme Court in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co. I" Secondly, the courts have failed to differentiate
between different types of "discretionary accounts." For example,
the scheme determined to be a security in Continental Commodities
has little relationship to the one involved in Milnarik, except that
both share the same name."
Courts in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held a discretionary
account to be a security; courts in the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth have said it is not a
security. The D.C. Circuit indicated it might join the first group. Note that since most of
these are district court decisions it is quite possible that the circuit court of appeals for that
circuit may reach a different conclusion when presented with the issue.
3. The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" to include investment con-
tracts. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
4. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,167 (7th
Cir. 1977); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Milnarik v.
M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
5. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
6. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
7. Id. at 522.
8. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,167 (7th Cir. 1977).
9. Id. at 92,292 to 93.
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the Court attempted to give a useful test for an
investment contract, a test that was meant to reflect the meaning that had been given to the
term by the state courts and incorporated by Congress into the Federal Securities laws. The
Howey definition, which is set out in the text accompanying note 13, infra, and the rationale
behind it were reaffirmed in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 850 (1975).
11. For a discussion of other schemes which have been included in the expanded defini-
tion of security, see Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security", 27
U. MIAMI L. REv. 395 (1973).
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This article will suggest an analytical framework for determin-
ing whether a discretionary account is an investment contract as
that term is currently defined and the three types of discretionary
accounts available in the market will be distinguished. Each type
of discretionary account will be examined to see whether the ele-
ment of common enterprise exists. Finally, the policy reasons which
indicate a need to expand the definition of security to encompass
such accounts will be presented, and the necessity of undertaking
an economic impact study before such expansion is made will be
argued.'"
II. DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS
Discretionary accounts which may be opened with a broker-
dealer are generally of three types. The first type, in which a group
of investors pool their money and have it invested at the broker's
discretion for their common benefit, is usually an investment con-
tract and thus a security.'3 It not only fits snugly within the Howey
model but also has aspects which are inherent in the concept of
security.'4 Like stock in a corporation, these discretionary accounts
represent shares in a whole whose profits are to be distributed ac-
cording to some predetermined ratio.
The second type, where the broker treats each investor's ac-
count separately and trades for each account with different objec-
tives, but where the broker himself is risking his own money or is
sharing in the profits generated by his trading skill, is arguably a
security. 5 Whether these accounts are considered securities depends
12. Florida requires that the legislature, prior to the enactment of any general or special
law, consider the economic impact of the proposed legislation upon the public and upon the
agency which will administer it. FLA. STAT. § 11.075 (Supp. 1976). Furthermore, before adopt-
ing, repealing, or amending any rule (except rules adopted due to immediate danger to public
health, safety, or welfare) all Florida agencies must give a summary of the estimated eco-
nomic impact of the rule on all persons affected by it. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1976).
13. Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968). See
generally, 1 L. Loss, SEcuaRIs REGULATION 495-96 (2d ed. 1961); H. SowAsRS, Federal Securi-
ties Acts, 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01 [13] (Matthew Bender 1976); Tew & Friedman,
In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic
Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MiAMI L.
REv. 407, 415 (1973).
14. In Howey the Court said that the definition of investment contract it had adopted
would permit "the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure
relative to the issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall
within the ordinary concept of a security.' H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11." 328
U.S. at 299.
15. SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935) (contract whereby one person
supplied funds, the other trading acumen, the profits to be shared 60-40 and the losses to be
borne only by the investing party). See, e.g., Maheu v. Reynolds and Co., 282 F. Supp. 423
19771
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upon whether the particular jurisdiction understands "common en-
terprise" to encompass both a common interest among investors
(horizontal), and a common interest between investor and promoter
(vertical)."5
Finally, there is the discretionary account in which the investor
deposits money with his broker to be traded at the broker's discre-
tion in a manner which will maximize the investor's objectives. 7
The broker does not share in the profits, but instead receives a
commission on each trade regardless of whether the trade realizes a
profit or a loss. It is submitted that this third prototype is not an
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) where the account was characterized as a "Joint Account." The courts have
failed to make this distinction in their factual findings; instead, they have simply found that
where the profits are to be generated through the efforts of the promoter, there is common
enterprise. See generally Loss supra note 7, at 489; 27 U. MAMI L. REv., supra note 7, at 416-
17. Some of the cases in which the courts have found a discretionary account to be an
investment contract may be of this type.
Brokers are prohibited from sharing in the profits or losses of their customers by NYSE
Rule 369 and ASE Rule 390. NASD Rules, art. M, § 3 provide that a broker acting as an
agent for his customer may charge him no more than a fair commission. NYSE GuIE, (CCH)
#2369; ASE GUIDE, (CCH) #9420; NASD MANUAL (CCH) #2154.
Furthermore, if a broker shares in the profits of his customer he may become an invest-
ment adviser under § 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Since brokers usually
charge a flat commission, it is most likely that the reason the discretionary account broker is
getting a share in the profits is because of the value of the exercise of his discretion. In short,
he is receiving additional compensation for his investment advice. Therefore, he is not ex-
cluded from the definition of investment adviser by virtue of the fact that he is a broker.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(11)(c). Unless he is exempted from registration by
§ 203(b), because he has not given investment advice to more than 15 persons in the preceed-
ing twelve months, he is prohibited from entering into any investment advisory contract
which provides for compensation on the basis of a share of the capital gains or of the capital
appreciation of the investment. Id. § 205(1).
Although undoubtedly there are brokers who, with their customers, enter into this second
type of discretionary account, the customer who wishes to challenge such an account has
recourse other than claiming that the discretionary account is a security. For a discussion of
why he may make such a claim anyway, see text accompanying notes 55-64 infra.
Note also that there are brokers who are not subject to any of these regulations. Most
brokerage firms have in-house rules regarding discretionary accounts, however, and other
exchanges or boards of trade may have similar rules for their members.
Furthermore, if the broker can avoid registration as an investment adviser because he
has had less than fifteen discretionary account customers, he could probably also qualify the
discretionary accounts as private placements under Rule 146 and section 4(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. If so, it does the customer little good to have the discretionary account
declared a security, since it would be exempt from registration. As discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 55-64 infra, obtaining rescission for failure to register the account is one of the
primary motives for seeking to have a discretionary account found a security.
16. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text infra.
17. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,738 (N.D. Ill. 1974); A.G. Edwards & Son, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 80,153; E.F. Hutton & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,007.
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investment contract because there is no "investment of money in a
common enterprise,"'" whether that term is viewed as requiring
vertical or horizontal commonality. 9
Il. COMMON ENTERPRISE
In 1946, the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co. 20 defined an investment contract as "a contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party."'"
An investor who opens a discretionary account is investing his
money in reliance upon the expertise of the brokerage firm, expect-
ing that the firm's trading acumen will generate profits for him.
Therefore, by its very nature, a discretionary account satisfies the
first and third elements of the Howey test. These are the investment
of money and the expectation of profits derived from the efforts of
others. Whether or not there exists a common enterprise becomes
the determinative question.
The first decision to deal with the issue of whether a discretion-
ary account is an investment contract, Maheu v. Reynolds & Co.,"2
read the Howey test as requiring a finding of either a common enter-
prise or an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others.23
Finding that the investors had relied on the investment house to
18. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
19. [The] type of trading pool operation, wherein there is a common enter-
prise and reliance by the purchaser on the efforts of others to produce profits,
should be contrasted with the ordinary investment advisory contract, wherein the
investment adviser is authorized to invest for the purchaser, no part of his fee
being based upon a percentage of the profits. The latter situation does not involve
a security within the meaning of the Act.
SowARms, supra note 7, § 2.01[141.
20. 328 U.S. 293'(1946).
21. Id. at 298-99. Substantially the same language is later designated by the Court as a
"test." See note 18, supra and accompanying text.
22. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
23. The language in Loss quoted by the court as support for this is "the line [between
what is a security and what is not] is drawn . . . where neither the element of a common
enterprise nor the element of reliance on the efforts of another is present." 282 F. Supp. at
429 (citing Loss, supra note 13 at 491). Professor Loss does not say that either is sufficient to
find an investment contract. He simply says that there is no security where neither is present.
The court also cites Loss, supra note 13 at 489, for the proposition that "[tihe joint
account may constitute a security even if there was no pooling arrangement or common
enterprise among investors." 282 F. Supp. at 429 (emphasis added). But Loss only says that
a "pooling arrangement among investors (as in the Howey case) helps but is not essential."
(emphasis added). The Maheu court assumes that pooling arrangement and common enter-
prise are synonymous. This has been rejected by all the courts that have adopted the concept
of vertical commonality.
19771
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realize a profit for them, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the discretionary account itself, as distin-
guished from the commodities futures contracts which were being
traded, constituted a security.24 The court, again failing to discuss
the common enterprise element, 5 reaffirmed this reasoning in
Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc.2"
In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,7 an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Stevens before his appointment to the United States Supreme
Court, rejected this assumption.28 In Milnarik, the court noted that,
"judicial analysis of the question whether particular investment
contracts are 'securities' within the statutory definition have repeat-
edly stressed the significance of finding a common enterprise."29 The
court found "the element of commonality" absent. It reasoned that,
"[ajlthough the complaint does allege that Nelson (a broker with
defendant M-S Commodities) entered into similar discretionary
arrangements with other customers, the success or failure of those
other contracts had no direct impact on the profitability of plain-
tiffs contract. Nelson's various customers were represented by a
common agent but they were not joint participants in the same
investment enterprise."30
Subsequent decisions3 have characterized Milnarik as defining
common enterprise exclusively in terms of horizontal commonality.
24. 282 F. Supp. at 429.
25. "[The Howey] test is satisfied here by the allegation that Orimex would make all
investment decisions with respect to Berman's account, and by its alleged representation that
it could make a profit for him." Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Id.
27. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
28. It was also rejected by the Southern District of Iowa in Marshall v. Lamson Bros. &
Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974):
Admittedly, the Court in Maheu . . . took the position that a discretionary ac-
count "may constitute a security even if there was no pooling arrangement or
common enterprise among investors." . . . In view of the emphasis placed on
"common enterprise" in Howey and its repeated use as a criterion of investment
contract in subsequent cases, however, I cannot escape the conclusion that com-
mon enterprise is a necessary element of the Howey definition.
Id. at 488. The court then went on to say that to find common enterprise it need not find a
pooling arrangement, and that "[tihe element of 'common enterprise' is satisfied when a
single investor commits his funds to a promoter in hope of making a profit .... Id. at 489.
This superficial analysis is criticized by the court in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
supra note 4, at 92,293 n.6.
29. 457 F.2d at 276.
30. Id. at 276-77.
31. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochkind v.
Reynolds Securities, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975); Marshall v. Lamson Bros. Co.,
368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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That is, they interpret Milnarik as requiring the existence, through
a pooling of monies or proceeds, of a common interest among the
investors. Some of these courts have then rejected Milnarik and the
requirement of horizontal commonality by adopting the definition
of common enterprise promulgated by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises. 3 2 In that case the court
defined a common enterprise as "one in which the fortunes of the
investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and
success of those seeking the investment of third parties." 3 This form
of common interest between the investor and the promoter is known
as vertical commonality.u In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. 5
the Seventh Circuit reevaluated Milnarik in light of the decisions
following SEC v. Continental Commodities. It found that Milnarik
interpreted Howey as requiring a pooling of funds or a pro-rata
distribution of proceeds8 and reaffirmed its continued reliance upon
Milnarik's rationale. In holding that the discretionary account
opened by Hirk was not an investment contract, the court rejected
Hirk's attempt to fit within the Milnarik rule by alleging in his
amended complaint that his monies and those of other investors
were treated as if commingled.
"As if commingled" is not the same as commingled. Further-
more, each discretionary trading account is unitary in nature;
each account has a success or failure rate without regard to the
32. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 482 n.7.
34. See, e.g., SIPC v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168, 178 (D. Utah
1975).
35. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,167 (7th Cir. 1977).
36.In Milnarik, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the broker had simply acted as
an agent. Adopting the language of the district court, it mentioned the lack of pooling of funds
as a factor in the determination that the relationship created was no more than that of
principal and agent. 457 F.2d at 278. The district court analyzed the investment contract
cases and found that they were all situations where something looking very much like stock
in a corporation was sold under a different name. It found the scheme before it to be different.
The Seventh Circuit quoted the district court:
In the instant case, the "security" with which we are dealing is the "investment
contract" between the plaintiffs and Nelson creating the discretionary trading
account. The "security" has not been ...issued by the defendant and sold to
the plaintiff. Rather, the security . . . is an oral agency agreement in which the
theoretical "seller" becomes the agent of the "buyer." It is arguable that no
transaction whatsoever has occurred . . . since no interest of any kind has been
"transferred" or "sold" to the "buyer".... In essence, this contract creates an
agency-for-hire rather than constituting the sale of a unit of a larger enter-
prise. . . .Each contract creating this relationship is unitary in nature and each
will be a success or failure without regard to the others.
457 F.2d at 277 (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F.Supp. at 1151). See also
discussion at note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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others. Hirk's effort to sidestep this fact by stressing in paragraph
6 (of the amended complaint) that substantially similar transac-
tions were made in all accounts and that profits or losses ebbed
or flowed uniformly also fails because the necessary pooling re-
mains unshown.3 7
The court rejected the decisions following Continental Commodities
and its rationale, emphasizing once again the conflict among the
circuits.
Nevertheless, since the Hirk account was of a type three nature
(that is, one in which each investor deposits money in a separate
account and each investor alone reaps the consequences of trading
in his particular account) and the court did not discuss whether it
would be possible to satisfy the pooling requirement if the pooling
occurred between investor and promoter, accounts of a type two
nature (that is, those in which there is vertical commonality) may
still be considered investment contracts." Discretionary accounts in
which the broker's profits are linked with the profits of the account
traded would be investment contracts in jurisdictions adopting the
Glenn Turner definition of common enterprise. However, even in
these jurisdictions there would be no common enterprise in the third
type of discretionary account.
In SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.," the Fifth Circuit
did adopt the vertical commonality approach of Glenn Turner and
found that an investment contract existed where the broker was
simply earning commissions. It found that "the success of the trad-
ing enterprise as a whole and customer investments individually is
contingent upon the sagacious investment counseling of Continental
Commodities. '"1 This language must not be interpreted too broadly.
The success or failure of any business depends upon the quality of
its product, in this case the exercise of discretion. The trading enter-
prise in Continental Commodities, however, was involved in trading
commodities options making it a very unique kind of enterprise.'
If an investment firm is dealing primarily in options, as appears
to be the case in Continental Commodities, and if it is pooling the
37. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,167 (7th Cir. 1977) at 92,293.
38. For a discussion of the different types of discretionary accounts see notes 13-19 supra,
and accompanying text.
39. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 522-23.
41. If a buyer chooses to exercise his option, the firm must incur the considerable cost
of supplying the futures contract. Substantial losses by the firm would make it unable to
fulfill its commitment to other investors who choose to exercise their options. Therefore,
where a firm is dealing in options, the success of the firm and of each investor's account are
both contingent on the sagacity of the investment counselor.
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money it receives from each investor in order to buy the futures
contracts upon exercise of the option,42 then these discretionary ac-
counts arguably are comparable to type one (horizontal com m*onal-
ity), since there would be a common interest among the investors
in how the broker handled their pooled resources and the venture
would not be feasible without such pooling."
The courts following Continental Commodities have failed to
recognize the difference between that trading scheme and the
scheme before them." To these courts Continental Commodities has
come to stand for the proposition that no pooling among investors
is necessary where the broker has discretion to trade. Broker discre-
tion means vertical commonality, and that is sufficient to find com-
mon enterprise. 5 Where the analysis of these courts fails is in ignor-
ing the possibility that in the particular scheme before the court
there may be no common economic interest between investor and
broker.
Properly understood, Continental Commodities does not stand
for the proposition that a discretionary account inherently involves
a common enterprise. The successful operation of the scheme in
Continental Commodities required a pooling of funds. Thus vertical
commonality, in the Glenn Turner sense, existed because of the
distinctive nature of options trading." The discretionary account in
42. It would especially need to pool investors' funds to buy the commodities futures
contracts if the firm were dealing primarily in "naked" options-that is, where the broker
writes the option without owning the underlying contract. For a discussion of commodities
options as securities, see Borton and Abrahams, Options on Commodity Futures Contracts
as Securities in California, 29 Bus. LAw. 867 (1974); Long, The Naked Commodity Contract
As a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1973). See also SEC v. Commodity Options
International, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,072 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. In Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1974), the court found that
unauthorized commingling of funds was not sufficient to establish a common enterprise.
Presumably this is limited to situations where the venture could be undertaken without the
commingling of funds. Implicit in the finding of an investment contract in both Howey and
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) is the finding that the promised
venture would not be feasible without a pooling of resources. In Hirk v. Agri-Research Coun-
cil, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,167 at 92,293, the court noted that a
common enterprise existed in Glenn Turner because a pooling of funds was necessary to the
scheme.
44. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
45. See cases cited at note 2 supra.
46. It is noteworthy that in Glenn Turner a common enterprise was found to exist due
to the common interest of the investor and the promoter. 474 F.2d at 482. Continental
Commodities Corp. was behaving much like a promoter in its option trading scheme, thus
making the analogy possible. The usual broker-investor relationship is very different from
that of promoter-investor, howevir, making the applicability of the Glenn Turner definition
of common enterprise questionable absent a showing of some substantial economic interest
between broker and investor. That interest is inherent in the promoter-investor relationship.
An argument can be made that the broker is "promoting" his discretionary accounts but in
reality these are often requested by the investors, rather than promoted by the brokers.
19771
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Continental Commodities, therefore, may be considered as fitting
within either of types one or two. The decision does not deal with
accounts of the type three nature.47
In Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."8 the
court refused to follow Continental Commodities, adopting instead
the Milnarik rationale. It explained its reasoning thus:
The Court, in Continental, seems to take the view that the ele-
ment of common enterprise as such is less important than the
other elements and that if the tests of "investment of money" and
"led to expect profits solely from the efforts of others" are met,
the common enterprise element somehow is blanketed in ....
Our reading of Howey leaves us with the distinct impression that
the Court there laid down a test comprising three elements ...
When the Seventh" Circuit in Continental uses the term
"resilient approach" it apparently does so in reliance on the lan-
guage in Howey where the Court, in reference to its definition of
investment contract (one that relies on the three elements herein-
above set forth), says that it "embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profits." We view this
as a characterization of the definition set down by the Court and
not as a license to interpolate or relax the necessary ingredients.
Involved in Curran were discretionary accounts from which,
regardless of losses, the investor could not withdraw for eighteen
months. The plaintiff argued that there was a pooling of funds and
pro-rata sharing in the proceeds.5 The Court found that since defen-
dant's interest was limited to commissions and plaintiff had opened
his account independently of other investors, there was no common
enterprise.52
In Curran, it is unclear whether the contracts fit within type
one or type three as the court did not decide whether in fact pooling
47. Nevertheless, Continental Commodities has been cited as authority for finding type
three discretionary accounts in commodities futures contracts to be investment contracts.
See, e.g., Scheer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Richkind v. Reynolds Secs., Inc., 388 F.
Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975).
48. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,862 (E.D. Mich. 1976). This was the first
court in the Sixth Circuit to deal with the issue and the first since Continental Commodities
to follow Milnarik.
49. The court meant the fifth circuit.
50. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,862 at 91,130-31 (E.D. Mich. 1976)(footnote added).
51. The court quotes from the plaintiff's memorandum. Id. at 91,128.
52. Id. at 91,131.
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of the investors' funds was necessary to the operation of the
scheme.53 The court rejected the rationale of Continental
Commodities,54 but failed to adopt an analytical framework of its
own.
After Hirk it is unclear whether Hirk or Milnarik preclude a
finding of a common enterprise where there is a pooling of funds or
proceeds between investor and broker. Furthermore, a discretionary
account may now be found to be an investment contract even
though the investor was unaware of the pooling of funds if in fact
the scheme could not operate without such pooling. So, whether or
not pooling is necessary to the scheme becomes a relevant inquiry.
Summarizing, common enterprise under the Howey test has
been defined in two ways: (1) that there be a common interest
among the investors in the scheme being promoted; or (2) that the
investor and the promoter have a common interest in the scheme.
Since a finding of common enterprise is the determinative issue in
deciding whether a discretionary account is an investment contract,
an analysis of the elements comprising the common enterprise fac-
tor in the discretionary account is required. Such analysis demands
differentiation among the three different types of accounts currently
available. This differentiation leads to the conclusion that discre-
tionary accounts where investors pool funds or share on a pro-rata
basis in proceeds with each other or with their brokers may be found
to constitute investment contracts. The discretionary account of the
third type, however, lacks the element of common enterprise. Lack-
ing this element, it cannot be an investment contract and therefore
it is not a security. These accounts exist where each investor expects
that the account will be handled individually and that broker com-
missions will be standard regardless of profit or loss. Accounts of
this type were involved in Hirk and Milnarik.
IV. CONCLUSION
All of the cases55 which have decided the issue of whether a
discretionary account is a security have involved discretionary com-
53. The court quotes plaintiffs allegations of pooling of funds, states that it will follow
Milnarik, but does not make a specific finding of fact that there was no pooling arrangement.
Since the investors could not withdraw from the "Specialized Guided Account Trading Pro-
gram" until 18 months had passed, this is not the ordinary discretionary account. Again, as
in Continental Commodities, the nature of the enterprise might be such that the venture
would not be feasible without a pooling of funds. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text
supra.
54. See language quoted in text at notes 48-50 supra.
55. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
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modities accounts, either futures contracts or options." In all of
them there is a desire on the part of the plaintiff to apply the
Securities Acts57 to these transactions. The courts have consistently
held that a commodities futures contract is not a security and there-
fore does not come under the regulation of the Securities Acts. 5
Therefore, in order to apply the protections of the Acts to transac-
tions in commodities futures, it was necessary to find that the trad-
ing account itself was a security. This need was especially compel-
ling when the commodity being traded was not a regulated com-
modity." Furthermore, unlike the Securities Acts,6" the Commodi-
ties Exchange Act does not expressly provide for civil liability.
This situation has recently changed, so that from a policy
standpoint, applying the Securities Acts to commodities accounts
is less justifiable. As a result of the 1974 amendments, all commodi-
ties except onions are regulated by the Commodities Exchange Act"
and courts have implied a civil right of action for churning and
margin violations.6" Therefore, it is no longer necessary to find the
56. Only SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) involved
a discretionary account in commodities options. That this makes the case unique is discussed
at notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
57. The Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-302, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1970) and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1-34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
58. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder,
413 F. Supp. 852 (D.C.C. 1976); Bartley v. P.G. Commodities Assocs., Inc., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Weiss Sec., Inc.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Scheer v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Golding v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
385 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669 (C.D.
Col. 1973); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. La. 1972); Schwartz v.
Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F.
Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59. Prior to the 1974 Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act §§ 1-12, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-17a (1970) as amended by 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (Supp. 1975), only those commodities listed
in section 2 of the Act were considered regulated. The provisions of the Act did not apply to
any commodity not listed in section 2. Bartley v. P.G. Commodities Assocs., Inc., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Therefore, plaintiffs
tried to invoke the protections of the Securities Acts. In re Weiss Sec., Inc., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This approach was
thoroughly unsuccessful unless a discretionary account was involved. See note 45 supra.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d, 78i, 78r (1970).
61. The 1974 amendments added to the definition of "commodity" the following "and
all other goods and articles, except onions . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in .... " Commodity Ex-
change Act § 2(a), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
62. The courts have implied a civil right of action for churning under the Commodity
Exchange Act § 4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970) (Booth v. Peavey Company Commodity Servs.,
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discretionary account to be a security in order to protect an other-
wise remediless public.
Despite the expanded protection of the Commodities Exchange
Act and the considerable remedies available to investors under the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, plaintiffs will con-
tinue to argue that all discretionary accounts are securities. Since
failure to register a security is a prima ftcie violation of section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933, plaintiffs can rescind the transaction
under section 123 of that Act if they succeed in establishing. that
these accounts are securities. This gives them a remedy even if they
are unable to prove any violation based on the underlying security
or commodities trading. 4
Furthermore, the SEC has recently refused to issue no-action
letters in three situations where the broker proposed to allow his
customers to open discretionary accounts which would be traded
individually, according to the objectives of each investor, and solely
on the basis of commissions." The refusal was grounded on the
existing conflict among the circuit courts.
The uncertainty resulting from this conflict places brokers and
dealers in a situation where they must either register their discre-
tionary accounts and distribute account prospectuses to their cus-
tomers or risk having a court grant rescission if substantial losses
dampen customer enthusiasm. The costs of registering all discre-
tionary accounts would be prohibitive, and would result in the com-
plete elimination of discretionary accounts from the market." Al-
though an in-depth economic impact study of the function and de-
sirability of discretionary accounts is beyond the scope of this arti-
430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., [Current] FED: SEC. L. REp. (CCH) $ 96,167 (7th Cir.
1977)), and for margin violations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 30(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78g(f) (Palmer v. Thompson & McKinnon Auchinclass, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,000 (D. Conn. 1977)).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
64. This remedy was sought in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), and in Wiggin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 446 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1971).
65. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,153; Commodity Management Service Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,805; Robert Enright, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,671.
In E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH)
79,007, the Commission had granted a no-action letter under very similar circumstances.
66. The benefit to the broker of operating a discretionary account is not sufficient to
justify the costs of registering the account. This problem could be solved by exempting
discretionary accounts from registration under a rule promulgated pursuant to the authority
conferred to the SEC by the Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
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cle, it is suggested that such a study should be undertaken before
the courts expand the definition of securities to include discretion-
ary accounts. 7 Among the factors to be considered given the volatil-
ity of the commodities market, are whether an end to discretionary
accounts would restrict commodities futures trading to those inves-
tors either constantly able to monitor the market or constantly
available to their brokers so that the order to trade might be given;
and whether requiring a registration prospectus would inform the
investor of any risk which is not already apparent from the very
nature of the transaction. 8 Balanced against these difficulties are
the protections" which the Securities Acts seek to offer to investors
in the market and which would not be available under the provi-
sions of the Commodities Exchange Act.70
The current state of the law in this area allows courts to forego
such a balancing of interest by a mechanical application of preced-
ent. This will eventually allow one of the competing interests to
triumph without intelligent choice by either the judiciary or the
legislature.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress may decide to redefine the scope of the Securities Acts
to include within their protection commodities futures. Even so,
because all discretionary accounts which are securities must be reg-
istered it is essential, if discretionary accounts are to survive at all,
67. For a discussion of the importance of a cost-benefit analysis in government regula-
tion, see R. MILLER & J. MOPSKY, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF IMPACT STATEMENT
REQUIREMENTS FOR REGULATORY. AGENCIES (1976) [hereinafter cited as MILLER & MOFSKY].
68. In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), the court questions whether there
is any practical need for a registration statement: "A perusal of the information required in
the registration statement . . . demonstrates the inapplicability of a typical registration
statement to the instant situation." See also Loss, supra note 13, at 468.
Furthermore, the acceptance of discretionary authority is usually conditioned on the
broker obtaining written authorization from the customer. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 408, NYSE
GUIDE (CCH) 2408; ASE Rule 421, ASE GUIDE (CCH) 9441; NASD art. Im, sec. 15, NASD
MANUAL (CCH) 2165. Therefore, what little can be disclosed about the accounts may
actually be disclosed under the rules of the industry or of the brokerage firm since the
customer must be made aware that he is giving his broker discretionary authorization.
69. There are conflicting viewpoints on the protection which the Securities Acts have
provided investors. Compare SEC Report, [1963-1972 Special Studies Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) §§ 74,001-74,431 with Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market,
37 J. Bus. 117 (1964); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. ECON. REv. 132 (1973) and MILLER & MOFSKY,
supra note 67, at 13.




that courts develop standards to establish which accounts are in-
vestment contracts under Howey.
To decide whether a given discretionary account comes within
the Howey definition the court must determine that either a type
one (investors pool funds) or type two (broker and investor share
proceeds or risk capital) account is involved. This is a factual deter-
mination which depends on whether: (1) the success or failure of the
individual account directly affects other accounts handled by the
broker, (2) the broker's profit is to some extent dependent on suc-
cess; and (3) the broker is risking money or other capital along with
the investor. The court must then decide as a matter of law whether
there is sufficient horizontal or vertical commonality to satisfy the
Howey test. If it finds that a common enterprise exists, the court
will find that an investment contract exists.
Even if the courts decide that these types of discretionary ac-
counts are securities, brokers and dealers could still offer their cus-
tomers a type of discretionary account (type three) geared to fulfill
their investment objectives and on which the broker will make a
standard commission regardless of profit or loss. From a policy
standpoint, these accounts should not be held to be securities be-
cause: (1) a registration statement is of limited value since there is
little that can be disclosed about a discretionary account beyond the
fact that the broker is being given discretion to trade according to
stated objectives; (2) discretionary accounts make commodities
trading viable for investors who wish to speculate but do not have
the time or experience to constantly follow a volatile market; (3) the
underlying item of trade is being regulated already either by the
Securities Acts or by the Commodities Exchange Act; and (4) call-
ing the account itself a security thwarts congressional intent by
allowing the application of the Securities Acts to what are essen-
tially commodities transactions under the jurisdiction of the Com-
modities Trade Commission."
The analytical framework proposed in this article would allow
the SEC to examine investment schemes presented to it by brokers
under a consistent test and to issue no-action letters accordingly.
This allows for market regulation and market expansion to exist in
some degree of harmony by avoiding irrational barriers to new in-
vestments and uncertain risks to brokerage firms, both of which
raise the costs of trading in securities.
71. 56 U.S.C. § 5001 (1970 & Supp. 1975).
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